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Abstract This paper examines why robots are so often
presented as monstrous in the popular media (e.g. film,
newspapers), regardless of the intended applications of the
robots themselves. The figure of the robot monster is
examined in its historical and cultural specificity—that is, as
a direct descendent of monsters that we have grown accus-
tomed to since the nineteenth century: Frankenstein, Mr.
Hyde, vampires, zombies, etc. Using the psychoanalytic
notion of projection, these monsters are understood as rep-
resenting human anxieties regarding the dehumanising ten-
dencies of science and reason, and regarding a perceived
transformation in human nature over the last two hundred
years. In analysing these anxieties, we can therefore gain
insight into the fears—genuine or naı¨ve—that the public
harbours towards new advancements in technology; these
insights can then inform those working with and designing
livingmachines as to how their inventionsmight be received.
Keywords Robots  Freud  Anxiety  Terminator 
Asimov  Cˇapek
1 Introduction
Why are we afraid of robots? We are not, of course, only
afraid of robots, and there is a growing body of evidence to
demonstrate that our attitudes to robots are becoming more
positive, or that we are at least more ambivalent in our
perceptions. But the robots that continue to dominate the
popular imagination—in newspaper headlines, film, tele-
vision and video games—demonstrate a complex array of
anxieties that we harbour towards the very idea of robots,
cyborgs, AI and imagined future technologies more
generally.1
To understand why we are afraid of robots, it is neces-
sary to remind ourselves of what sort of robots it seems that
people actually fear. The public are, most likely, unlikely
to be afraid of the robots in university labs, the real robots
that exist right now, or the sort of robots or AI with which
we are already engaging every day. People are much more
worried about the Terminators, those near-human cyborgs
such as those we’ve seen in Blade Runner, the less-than-
human slaves that rise in I, Robot, or the Borg of Star Trek.
People fear the sort of robots that tabloid newspaper editors
tell us are going to be walking the streets tomorrow, the
ones that inspire headlines such as ‘Rise of the Terminator-
style robots that can decide when and who to kill, warns
expert’2 or ‘Rise of the Cybermen: The Terminator-style
bionic ear that could give people ‘‘superman’’ hearing’3 or
‘Man given ‘‘terminator-like’’ prosthetic limb’4 or ‘Robot
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1 Here, I use the term ‘robot’ broadly, to refer to a range of new
technologies, and imagined technologies, which also includes what
might properly be called cyborgs, or artificial intelligence, or
teleoperative machines, etc. Since the popular imagination does not
seem to discriminate, and instead regards all of these technologies as
a sort of nebulous, ill-defined ‘other’, it is not important to do so here.
It is better, in fact, to look at these fears more generally, in order to
fully understand the nature and source of the beliefs.
2 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1204072/Warning-
Rise-Terminator-style-robots-decide-kill.html#ixzz2lwfSD2zc.
3 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2318279/Scientists-
create-breakthrough-bionic-ear-using-cybernetics–Terminator-style-
machines-next.html#ixzz2lwfklGjm.
4 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/science-video/9656189/
Man-given-terminator-like-prosthetic-limb.html.
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vacuum cleaner ‘‘attacks’’ South Korean housewife’s
hair’.5
These images and imaginings provide us with a wealth
of evidence, not as to what robots are really like, or might
really be like one day, but as to what people genuinely fear.
Like all of the monsters human cultures have created over
the millennia, from AI to zombies, from Medusa to
Cybermen, the monsters we imagine are not real, but offer
tremendous insights into the very real anxieties and fears of
human beings in a particular cultural context.
There are a myriad of possible answers as to why we are
afraid of robots, most of which have at least some validity
in specific contexts. The answers that we tend to favour
will depend on our theoretical predispositions, of course,
and our own disciplinary interests. Coming from back-
ground that looks at the products of our culture (literature,
film, etc.) from a psychoanalytic, post-Freudian perspec-
tive, I would suggest that our fear of robots, cyborgs, AI,
etc., could represent
a fear of death, or annihilation
a fear of individual disintegration and being subsumed
within a collective identity
a fear of the ‘dead mother’ (Green 1993), the unrespon-
sive, empty container that is incapable of responding to
us in a meaningful, emotional way6 the (predictable)
Oedipal fear of the father (the law, social reality, or the
return of our own violent impulses) or, more impor-
tantly, the fear of the castrating son, the progeny that
returns to destroy us.
Each of these explanations can be applied to the popular
conceptions of the robot as a mindless, ruthless, incessant,
destructive automaton. However, in this paper I would like to
focus on something rather different: an understanding of
destructive, persecuting robots as projections of our own
(unconscious) human selves. This explanation is not exclu-
sive, and embraces many of these other ideas, while simul-
taneously grasping why these monsters are so profoundly
frightening to twentieth- and twenty-first-century audiences.
That the Terminator, the Borg, Cybermen and their
descendants—with their slow, sometimes awkward but
irrepressible movement, and their obsessive, single pur-
pose—resemble both Frankenstein’s monster and zombies
is also a clue to their origins, and the anxieties that they
arouse in the public imagination. For when we consider
robot monsters, we need to regard them within the context
of an entire history of monsters that have been imagined
over the centuries—ghosts haunting ancient castles, vam-
pires, werewolves, Frankenstein, Mr. Hyde, atomic dino-
saurs, aliens and zombies are all the direct ancestors of The
Terminator, HAL 9000, the andys in Do Androids Dream
of Electric Sheep? and all the other bad robots we’ve been
subjected to over the last eighty or so years, since Ros-
sum’s Universal Robots and Rotwang’s Maria. Our robotic
monsters are part of a very specific cultural, social and
historical context, and by examining this context we can
gain a much better understanding of what it we are really
afraid of. More pragmatically, for those that would design
real robots, such an analysis might provide invaluable
insights into how to address public concerns and how to
build robots that are more readily accepted by an often
sceptical public.
2 Frankenstein, the modern Prometheus
Frankenstein and his monster emerge, if not at the very
beginning, at a specific point very early in our modern
(mis)understanding of robots. The influential science-fic-
tion writer Isaac Asimov had an idea of the ‘Frankenstein
Complex’ (Asimov 1947), which, for Asimov, is a com-
pelling account for our fear of technology. Frankenstein—
and here we refer to the scientist, not the monster—is a
culturally specific Faust, the mad scholar who seeks dan-
gerous knowledge and who desires to supersede God (cf.
Gill Karamjit 2013; Schuler 2013). Frankenstein, like
Faust, is a victim of hubris and demonstrates that human
endeavour, science and technology, whatever their noble
intentions, inevitably create a monster that will gain
autonomy and return to haunt us.
We see this fundamental archetype7 time and again in
our fantasies of monstrous robots. In Blade Runner, for
example, Scott’s (1982) cinematic adaptation of Dick’s
(1968) novella, Do Android’s Dream of Electric Sheep?,
the andy Rory Batty tracks down Dr. Tyrell, his creator,
and demands ‘I want more life, Father!’. Similarly, when
Harrison Ford’s Rick Deckard is trying to make Rachel
Rosen believe that she is an android, he reminds her of a
memory from her childhood, thinking that this intimate
knowledge proves his case beyond doubt: One summer in
Rachael’s youth, there was a spider outside her window,
orange body, green legs. Rachael watches this spider
weave a web all summer, then one day there appears a big
egg in the web. The egg hatches, and a hundred baby
spiders come out, and they eat their mother.
One can easily regard these to be classical Freudian
fantasies of being superseded (devoured) by ones
5 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/southkorea/113
99713/Robot-vacuum-cleaner-attacks-South-Korea-housewifes-hair.
html.
6 This is the theme I have explored elsewhere, for example, in ‘Why
are We Afraid of Robots?: The Role of Projection in the Popular
Conception of Robots’.
7 In using this word I wish in no way to endorse Carl Jung’s use of
the term/concept or ideas.
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progeny; Freud himself might have pointed to the Greek
myths of Cronos and Uranus, or Zeus and Cronus—di-
vine versions of the familiar Oedipus–Laius story to
which Freud so often turned, in which the son rises to
vanquish the father, and so proving that we sow the
seeds of our own destruction. And there is certainly
some validity in such a reading; however, this is not the
only lesson that can be garnered from the Frankenstein
mythology.
From Frankenstein, too, we see the old story of forbid-
den knowledge and its consequences, and the role of
hubris, that over-reaching pride and arrogance that leads to
the downfall of Greek protagonists. For us today, these
aspects of the story seem less vital than they were to the
ancient Greeks, with their stories of Prometheus and
Oedipus revealing something intrinsic to their conception
of human nature. These facets of the story, however, have
nevertheless served to remind audiences over the last two
hundred years that we create the monsters that destroy us,
or are at least complicit in the creation. But while this, too,
is a useful starting place, the re-imaginings of the
Frankenstein myth in robotic monsters are not merely
suggesting that it is the hubris, or forbidden knowledge, or
the Evil Scientist that we must fear, but something more
nuanced and slightly more complex, which becomes
apparent if we look in more detail the historical context of
Frankenstein.
For the Romantics, Frankenstein is not a monster but a
‘modern Prometheus’, as Mary Shelley’s book (1818) is
subtitled. Frankenstein is a hero because he represents the
best qualities of the individual, or the ideal of the Artist, as
it was newly conceived in the Romantic imagination. (This
is something that we in the twenty-first century have
inherited, with slight modifications). This individual, a
version of the U¨bermensch, is ambitious, ungoverned by
any authority; he boldly and nobly drags the human race
forward, in spite of the pitchfork-wielding mobs that would
see humanity held back. The Romantics regularly made
heroes of such figures, as we can see in Goethe’s rework-
ings of the stories of Faust and Prometheus, Byron’s ode to
Prometheus, and Percy Shelley’s play Prometheus
Unbound and in the many other works on similar themes
that followed soon thereafter.
The Romantics, then, were not afraid of Frankenstein.
But we cannot say that they were completely, universally
enamoured of this figure, either. Shelley’s Gothic novel is
perhaps the best example that demonstrates a more
ambivalent relationship with this hero. And ambivalence
does not mean indifference, as it now so often (incorrectly)
used. The Romantics recognised in the Promethean hero
both positive and negative aspects of this ideology, and
while they might have lionised this figure, they also, at
times, saw a darker side to him.
It is in the darker side of this modern Prometheus that
we see the Romantics offering some of the same lessons
about the over-reaching power of human ambition, about
the hubris of invention. But we also see another theme in
Romantic and Gothic literature (which of course was not
accidentally contemporary with Romanticism): the idea not
only that we create the monsters that destroy us, but that we
ourselves are becoming those monsters. The monsters in
the early Gothic tales portray the ghosts of ancient aristo-
crats living in the dilapidated castles outside the reaches of
modern urban reason.8 With Romanticism, however, and
nineteenth-century Gothic tales, we see a new kind of
monster: monsters that live among us in our cities of reason
(Dracula), that we are building from our scientific inven-
tion (Frankenstein), or that lie hidden in our unconscious,
animalistic selves (Mr. Hyde).
And it is in this context that we need to understand our
present-day robot monsters, as part of this two-hundred-
year tradition (for we are still in many ways living in the
post-Romantic period). When we see Frankenstein in the
context of robots, we realise that it is not just technology
that we fear, or that technology will gain autonomy and
move beyond our control. Rather, looking at Frankenstein,
we learn that what we fear is the very quality of ourselves
that enables us to create the monster; partly, this is ambi-
tion, hubris, etc., but also, and more specifically in this
cultural context, we are becoming the robots that we so
fear. We fear becoming an empty, mechanical shell of
cold, unfeeling rationalism. We are afraid of losing, or that
we have already lost, the very qualities that we deem to
define us as human.
What we fear in the robot is not just that they are
soulless and mechanical, but that we ourselves have
become soulless and mechanical, as we are increasingly
governed, like Frankenstein, by rationalism and scientific
method. We fear the consequences of the ‘art’ that creates
the monster—that our devotion to science and industry,
reason and rationality is rendering us less human. The
robotic monsters that we see on our screens and in the
pages of our novels and newspapers are in fact projections:
our fears about ourselves and our world put out there, seen
as something other rather than ourselves.
3 Projections
Projection is an idea with its roots in Freudian psycho-
analysis, but has been considerably enriched by Freud’s
disciples and contemporary psychoanalytic clinical and
cultural theory. The concept of projection tries to describe
object relations, that is, the way that people relate to
8 See, for example, The Castle of Otranto, The Monk.
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things—usually other people, but also other material and
non-material objects in their world. Ideas of projection, and
the related notion of projective identification, are used in
cultural studies to provide compelling explanations for
phenomenon as diverse as Nazism and teenage crushes,
racism and sports spectatorship.
With projection, it is believed that in psychological
fantasy we split off parts of ourselves—feelings, thoughts,
or fantasies—and ‘project’ them into something else—a
person, an object, or even a symbol or an idea—which can
then be regarded as a sort of container for these projections
(cf. Klein 1946; Bion 1962; Anzieu 1984). Sometimes,
good parts of the self are projected into containers, for safe
keeping; for example, one may project a good part of the
self into a container so that it can identify with that part in
another. This idea of projective identification can be seen
in cultural phenomena such as nationalism, wherein indi-
vidual people project their own positive qualities (say,
resilience) into a symbol, or an idea, or a leader, and that
shared association provides collective cohesion, a group
identity (cf. Young 1994). Projective identification also
provides the basis for understanding empathy, which can be
increasingly seen to be a key characteristic in the very way
we define and distinguish ourselves as human—see, for
example, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, Blade
Runner, The Terminator.9
On the other hand, sometimes negative parts of the self
are projected into a container (and in practice it is usually a
combination of good and bad parts that are projected). Bad
parts of the self—violent fantasies, hatred, anxieties, for
example—can be projected away from the self, in an act of
disavowal. In keeping such bad elements at bay, the self
can be thought of as pure and all good. When such pro-
jections find a home in another, that container is then
imagined the source of that badness, as the hatred and
violence are disowned by the self; the container then
becomes a persecuting figure as the hatred and violence
that is projected out returns in the form of the other.
Though Freud introduced the notion of projection,
psychoanalytic thinking since has elevated this idea to
greater, or even of the utmost, importance. Projections and
projective identifications are, for many, at the very centre
of human communications and human experience. But
most importantly for our purposes here, projections can be
thought of as a way of managing anxiety. It is through such
projections that we come to know and understand the
world, through reality testing and emotional engagement.
Into an unknown, uncertain space, we fantasise all sorts of
things in order to defend ourselves against the greater fear
of uncertainty and emptiness, or against the ‘unthought
knowns’—those things that we know, unconsciously, but
that we cannot or wish not to face consciously (cf. Bollas
1987).
These processes have a vital role to play in all learning
and experience, including normal, healthy development,
and both normal and ‘pathological’ forms are evident in
everyday life. The most obvious examples of such pro-
jections are instances of scapegoating, as commonly seen
with racism (and here we see another all-too-familiar
component of nationalism): It is not we who are violent, it
is them. They hate us and are out to get us. As with the
scapegoat, there is a belief that the container of the bad
parts of the self must be destroyed before it can return and
destroy us. This is a root of paranoia. The belief that we are
being persecuted is our own fantasy.
We see the same processes at work in the construction of
our monsters throughout the ages, in the barbaric brutality
of racial others, in sexualised vampires and in consumerist
zombies. The monster becomes a container for our own
barbaric, imperialist practices, our own repressed sexuality,
our own mindless pursuit of a promised ideal. And now we
see the same processes in popular representations of robots.
The Terminator, for example, or Star Trek’s Borg are,
among other things, projections of our own, very human,
violent fantasies placed into an other, an other which then
becomes a relentless, supremely destructive persecuting
object. We fail to see that fear and anxiety and violence as
our own, and imagine instead that it originates from the
robot itself. But this evil robot is nothing more than our
own violence, anxiety, hatred and fear imagined to exist in
a mechanical cage; they become these bad versions of
ourselves.
In Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, the main
character, Rick Deckard, provides us with a terrific
example of how such projections operate. He is a bounty
hunter, the epitome of the loner, who kills first and asks
questions later, but Deckard nevertheless believes that it is
the humanoid robot—the ‘andy’—that is ‘a solitary
predator’. The narrator tells us, ‘Rick liked to think of them
that way; it made his job palatable’ (Dick 1968).
Projections provide a defence against unwanted parts of
the self. And though they are an integral part of normal
development, a number of problems can arise from
excessive or uncontrolled projections.
• When we project excessively, it leaves us empty, or
feeling dead inside. This deadness we see reflected in
9 We sometimes project positive qualities into robots, which can be a
source of optimism for technology, or, more radically, utopian
fantasies about the possibilities offered by robots and AI, but this is
something for another study. However, if we were to look at how
positive projection (which isn’t necessarily a good thing) works with
regards to our fantasies about robots, we might, for example, look at
the promise (both realistic and unrealistic) some hold for robotics, or
how transhumanists’ enthusiasm for technology might be based on
such positive projections and idealisations.
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our monsters, the robots and zombies that are so
popular in contemporary fiction—monsters that are,
quite literally, dead or soulless.
• Excessive splitting and projections can leave one
feeling fragmented, in pieces. This is something we
see in the dismemberment so commonly seen in
representations of robots (and zombies), where bro-
ken-off pieces literally take on a life of their own.
• Projections can also be ‘misplaced’, that is, projected
into an unsuitable container. Such a contained is
incapable of returning or processing projections in a
useful or appropriate way, which can lead to feelings of
isolation or increasing the feelings of anxiety and
persecution.
• Excessive projections can lead to feelings of deperson-
alisation, feelings of not being real. Psychoanalysts
often describe such depersonalisation as being akin to
feeling like an automaton, an empty object in a world
empty of affect of feeling.
To summarise all of the above, our imagined monster
robots are projections of our own anxieties and fears about
ourselves and our cultural practices. Robots are containers
for our projections, so our fear of robots is, at least in part,
also a fear of our own rationalist selves.
4 The robot as a projection of the rational human
monster
Frankenstein and his descendants—Mr. Hyde, zombies and
all the robots we have come to fear, HAL 9000, the Ter-
minator, the Borg, killer andys, etc.10—are created by our
rationality, our industry and our science, and so these
monsters reflect all of the fears that we associate with these
other inventions: the inflexible logic of reason, the ruthless
efficiency of industry, the emotional detachment of sci-
ence. These monsters are not guided by hatred or ven-
geance or a fanatic devotion to irrational mythology, as
with spectres or savage brutes or religious extremists.
These soulless robotic monsters are made all the more
potent and frightening by the fact that they are guided by a
single principle: their violence and destruction is com-
pletely and utterly based in a calculated, indisputable logic,
a resolute dedication to their technological, rational, sci-
entific programming.
Robot monsters can therefore be seen as the living
embodiment of those projected bad parts of our self, those
negative parts of ourselves that we split off and lodge in an
external other. They are us, or, at least, those parts of
ourselves that we come to fear when we look at our tech-
nological creations—rational, efficient, cold, mechanical,
soulless and, ultimately, destructive.
It has often been pointed out that if a superior artificial
intelligence was to create robot soldiers to wipe out the
human race, then gun-wielding bipedal monsters would
just about be the least efficient way of going about it (e.g.
Armstrong 2014). And yet our fantasies persist in pre-
senting us with humanoid-robot monsters. There is a sim-
ple logic for these robots’ appearance, however: they are
us. They look like us because that is what we see when we
look into the mirror: an empty, violent, rational, mechan-
ical shell. There is something about these robots, how-
ever—that otherwise resemble us to a large and completely
unnecessary extent—that is missing, or that has been lost,
that makes them less than human, and this reflects our own
fears that we ourselves are becoming something less than
human, and that we are destroying some essential part of
our humanity in the process of becoming governed by
rational programming.
Such a casting of robots as missing something essen-
tially human has been evident for a long time, since the
inception of stories about robots. With the very invention
of the term robot, in Cˇapek’s play RUR, Rossum’s
Universal Robots (1920), there is this idea of the robot as a
human lacking a particular human element, and this carries
on in many of the stories told since. And this is true even
those for whom robots are not ‘evil’: in the Alien series,
Star Trek, Asimov’s own writings, Forbidden Planet, etc.,
robots, both good and bad, are portrayed as devoid of
emotion, lacking empathy or feeling, and governed only by
reason and a predictable, programmable intellect.
Historical context is again particularly enlightening.
Cˇapek’s play was staged in this period of increasing anx-
iety as to what was happening to us as a species, as a
culture, in a period (i.e. the very late nineteenth, early
twentieth century) and place (i.e. Western Europe) where
there is much interest elsewhere in dissociative disorders
(e.g. Freud), mechanisation (e.g. Frederick Winslow Tay-
lor, F. T. Marinetti) and alienation (e.g. Marx et al.).
Cˇapek’s play reflects these concerns regarding dehumani-
sation in the light of mass industrialisation, the increasing
mechanisation of killing seen during The Great War and a
loss of certain pastoral conceptions of human experience in
an increasingly urbanised world of technological innova-
tions. And today, we can still see those very same anxieties
that were first evident in Cˇapek’s robots: the same fear of
the militarisation, as expressed in the headlines that greet
each new, genuinely positive advance in robotics or pros-
thetics with dire warnings about the coming of terminators
or Cybermen; and the dehumanisation of human relation-
ships and the loss of jobs to mechanical systems, as
10 Though Robbie in Forbidden Planet (1956) is not a monster, we
also see in Dr. Morbius such a Frankenstein figure, as he has
unleashed a monster and claims to have been ‘careful and, hopefully,
dispassionate’.
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expressed in the intense speculation, in both the popular
press and from more reputable sources, suggesting that
robots are about to steal all of our jobs (cf. Frey and
Osborne 2013; House of Lords Digital Skills Committee
2015).
But what makes robots particularly terrifying mon-
sters—and especially suitable vehicles for our anxieties
about ourselves—is that while they become containers for
our fears about our rationality, the monster robots are not
only incessantly, unceasingly rational; they are also con-
tainers for all of those other darker, non-rational impulses
that have haunted human (un)consciousness for so many
millennia. Robots are all the more terrifying because they
represent both the horrors of reason—the inflexible doc-
trine of rationality, the precision and productivity of tech-
nology, the dispassionate methodology of science—and
our animalistic impulses: the irrational violence, the im-
pulsive desires for domination and control. And because
these are really our fears about ourselves, these robots
really are inescapable: we just pretend that it’s not us, it’s
them.
To regard robots in this way is not symptomatic of
technophobia; to understand fictional robots in this way is
not anti-science, or anti-industry. And this is not an argu-
ment to eschew technological progress, such as that made
by Alquist, the Tolstoyan hero of RUR, or to suggest that
we forgo reason and put an end to the remarkable process
that is being made with living machines and pause to
embrace our ‘inner fairy’, merely to preserve some out-
moded notion of ‘humanity’. Our conceptions of ourselves
are all constructed notions, and these arguments are not
meant to endorse some Romantic idea of ‘human nature’ or
some kind of naı¨ve genuine self to which we must ulti-
mately be true. It is important that we remember what
Asimov says regarding humanity’s seemingly endless
struggle with these anxieties: ‘Faust must indeed face
Mephistopheles, but Faust does not have to be defeated!’
(Asimov 1947).
Anxieties do not have to be based on sound, sober
judgement to have real consequences; in fact, it rarely
works out that way. Often, the more outrageously fantas-
tical the anxiety, the more it takes hold of us and takes
control of us. However, anxieties are very rarely useless,
and almost always tell us something very interesting and
profound about our relationship with ourselves and with
our world, or at least with how we view our relationship
with ourselves and the world. In analysing these repre-
sentations of monstrous robots, we can therefore gain great
insight into the fears—genuine or naı¨ve—that the public
harbours towards new advancements in technology,
insights that can inform those working with and designing
living machines as to how their inventions might be
received. But we also learn something about anxieties that
people have regarding their own conception of self, and
how that is changing in an increasingly scientific, rational,
technological world.
We need to learn to be more ambivalent about robots
and our relationships with them, to regard both positive and
negative in an informed and balanced way. There is some
reason for optimism, in that popular representations of
robots seem to be increasingly positive, or at least
ambivalent. Yes, the robots are still more often than not
The Baddies, but they are also increasingly, if not The
Goodies, at least offering certain solutions to the problems
of human existence, including our anxieties of rationalist,
mechanical dehumanisation. Daniel H. Wilson’s recent
novels Robopocalypse (2011) and Amped (2012) are two
examples, Pacific Rim (del Toro 2013) is another, and even
if we look at The Terminator films, by the second film,
Arnie is already a Good Guy helping John Connor (a trend
that becomes more prevalent in the subsequent instalments
in the franchise); so evidently there is some hope.
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